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 ABSTRACT 
The point of departure for this paper is that the European Union (EU) has affected 
national politics, policies and polities.  This process, labelled Europeanization, has led 
to changes in two interconnected political dimensions.  First, it has led to 
modifications in the relationships between state and non-state actors within the 
national arena.  Second, it has changed the interactions between the sub-national, 
national and supranational actors (state and non-state).  To explore these propositions 
the paper conducts an analysis of the interest representation patterns exhibited by non-
state actors.  The paper compares firms (in the telecommunications, gas and electricity 
sectors) and environmental groups (focused on nature conservation or biodiversity 
policy), both based in the United Kingdom (UK), in order to determine how, to what 
extent and why Europeanization has affected their interest representation behaviour.  
The activities displayed by the two sets of interests are compared and contrasted in 
terms of chosen lobbying targets (i.e. national government departments and EU 
institutions), routes and allies (i.e. direct contact or via intermediaries such as Euro-
groups) and the timing and character of the contact.  Ideas and tools drawn from 
management science (i.e. strategic decision making analyses) are employed to assist 
in deriving the causal explanations for the Europeanized patterns of behaviour.  It is 
argued that a combination of the three strategic decision making factors (i.e. internal 
organizational resources, objectives (and perceived rewards) and external political 
environments explain the contrasting behaviour of the firms and environmental 
groups. 
 INTRODUCTION 
The EU, its development and operation, has been the subject of academic debate for 
almost as long as the polity itself has existed.  For several decades International 
Relations (IR) scholars have rivalled one another in their efforts to ‘explain’ the EU.  
This enduring dispute, between and within the neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist camps that comprise the IR school, had reached something of an 
impasse by the late 1980s. Partly as a reaction against this stalemate, in the past 
decade a number of researchers and authors from national and comparative politics 
have begun to contribute to the discussion about the EU.  What distinguishes the latter 
from the former is their understanding of the processes in operation in the EU: the IR 
scholars have tended to view the EU as the product of a bottom-up mechanism in 
which national level factors create the supranational polity.  By contrast, the 
‘Europeanization turn’ in EU studies investigates the top-down impact of the EU on 
the domestic political systems.  
 
During the 1990s, research on Europeanization gathered momentum as academics 
variously investigated the EU-effect on national policies, politics and polities.  This 
paper contributes to that research exercise by examining interest representation on the 
part of national non-state actors and by exploring two interrelated contentions.   
Firstly, that the process of Europeanization has led to modifications in the 
relationships between state and non-state actors within national arenas.  Secondly, that 
the interactions between state and non-state actors at the sub-national, national and 
supranational levels have also been altered. To explore these propositions the paper 
examines empirical evidence gathered about non-state actors and their relationships 
with other actors at both the national and EU levels.  The empirical findings that 
provide the foundations for this paper are drawn from two sources. The first is a study 
(Fairbrass, 2002) of the Europeanization of business interests (i.e. individual firms), 
as a response to the EU's Single Market Programme and its attendant, numerous 
liberalization measures.   The study analysed the interest representation behaviour of 
the firms in terms of their size, industrial sector (telecommunications, energy and 
insurance) and country of registration (UK and France).  It also explored the 
interaction between the firms and policy makers at the national and the EU levels, and 
the relationships between the firms and intermediaries such as national and European 
wide trade associations.  Given the constraints of this paper, the full results of the study will not be presented here.  Rather, evidence about the UK based utilities (i.e. 
telecommunications, gas and electricity firms) will form the focus of this paper.  In 
addition, this paper draws on other extensive research concerned with the 
Europeanization of environmental policy in relation to the UK (Fairbrass and Jordan 
2001a and 2001b; Jordan, 2002; Fairbrass and Jordan 2002).  Again, given the 
constraints here and the extensive nature of the data collected, this paper will confine 
itself to evidence collected concerning the Europeanization of interest representation 
in one environmental policy area: that is, biodiversity policy and the two main 
directives that form the core of that policy area (the 1979 Wild Birds and 1992 
Habitats Directives). 
 
This paper focuses on the revealed behaviour of firms and environmental groups.   
Their chosen lobbying targets (i.e. national government departments and EU 
institutions), routes and allies (i.e. direct contact or via intermediaries such as Euro-
groups) and the timing and character of the contact are compared and contrasted with 
a view to determining how, to what extent and why Europeanization has affected their 
behaviour. To address these questions, this paper employs some tools and ideas 
borrowed from management science: namely, strategic decision making.  Crucially, 
strategic decision making (SDM) analyses provide a framework that exposes and 
highlights the role played by internal organizational resources, objectives, and 
external environments in determining the actions and strategies of organizations.  As a 
consequence, this paper explores both cause(s) and effects of Europeanization with 
regard to interest representation. 
 
The selected case study was chosen because it entails an examination of two policy 
sectors that are subject both to largely dissimilar conditions and forces (although they 
do share some common circumstances).  Crucially, business and environmental 
interests typically possess dissimilar levels of internal resources, pursue distinct 
policy objectives, and face contrasting external national environments.  For example, 
firms and the UK government have tended to share more common ground in terms of 
objectives than have the environmental groups and the government.  UK governments 
of the 1980s and 1990s advocated and undertook a market liberalization programme 
and this coincided with the objectives of the formerly nationalized UK firms in the 
utilities sector.  By contrast, UK based environmental groups found themselves taking an opposing line to that of the national ministry responsible for environmental policy 
(i.e. the Department of the Environment (DoE)) with regard to nature conservation.  
Moreover, UK business interests have tended to enjoy a more privileged position 
(Wilson 1990:102; Grant 2000:2) in the national policy making process than have 
environmental groups, although the potency of the business sector should not be 
overestimated (Smith 1993: 136 and 152-153).  By contrast, environmental groups 
tend to have been marginalized in UK policy-making (Cox et al. 1986: 184; Smith 
1993: 101-103) by the existence of an agricultural policy community that centred on 
the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) and the Ministry for Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries (MAFF).  These differing circumstances were expected to generate 
interesting variations in interest representation behaviour of the two sets of interests.  
However, they do share some common conditions in terms of the political 
environment at the EU level. Crucially, industrial and environment policies have 
broadly similar histories at the EU level.  Whilst market regulation and competition 
issues did feature prominently in the founding Treaties of the EU (for example, the 
1957 Treaty of Rome), neither industrial nor environmental measures were 
specifically included in them.  Subsequently, industrial policy and environmental 
policy have all been significantly Europeanized.  In both cases, the 1987 Single 
European Act played a significant part in supplying a solid legal basis to each of the 
policy areas and subsequent Treaties have consolidated this development.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 briefly reviews a number 
of analytical concepts and tools drawn from political science and management 
science.  The subsequent section applies strategic decision making analyses with a 
view to examining the causes of the Europeanization of interest representation.     
Section 3 explores the effects of Europeanization.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion about how, to what extent and why the interest representation of some UK 
non-state actors has been Europeanized. 
 ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND CONCEPTS 
Europeanization: definitions and implications 
The concept of Europeanization, which began to emerge during the 1990s, in political 
science literature concerned with the EU, is a contested one.  Since that time, a variety 
of definitions have been proffered (see inter alia Ladrech 1994; Rometsch and 
Wessels 1996: 328; Borzel 1999: 575-6; Cole and Drake 2000: 26-27; Radaelli 2000: 
3-4; Cowles et al. 2001:1; Bomberg 2002, 31-31; Buller and Gamble 2002).   
Disagreement arises between those authors that treat Europeanization as a 'process' 
and those who do not (and who regard it as a situation reached). For those scholars 
that perceive Europeanization to be a process, views are divided between those who 
approach Europeanization as a mechanism in which the EU impacts on the national, 
those who characterise it as a phenomenon that creates structures at the EU level, and 
those who regard it as an interactive, two way process.  The absence of agreement, 
combined with the view that that there is also a lack of consistent and systematic 
frameworks with which to account for the varying patterns of adaptation across 
countries and sectors (Knill and Lehmuhl 1999: 3), could make testing 
Europeanization problematic.  Clearly, at least, there are analytical difficulties in 
separating ‘cause’ from ‘effect’.  For example, changes to national politics, policies 
and polity are likely to be the product of a variety of factors, many of which may have 
no link to the EU (e.g. global pressures or technological factors).  
 
Nevertheless, the lack of a commonly accepted definition of the term Europeanization 
has not presented a barrier to empirical work.  A number of studies have examined the 
impact of the EU on domestic political structures (e.g. Meny et al. 1996, Lesquesne 
1996; Bulmer and Burch 1998).  Other work has focused on particular policy areas.  
Those that are particularly relevant to this paper include research on industrial (e.g. 
Kassim and Menon 1996; V Schmidt 1996) and environmental policy (e.g. Jordan 
2002; Knill and Lenschow 2001).  A few studies have examined the impact of the EU 
on interest representation (e.g. Kohler-Koch 1994; Lehmkuhl 2000; Cowles 2001).  
This paper contributes to the discourse by examining the EU-effect on interest 
representation in one country (i.e. the UK) and comparing two policy sectors 
(industrial policy and environmental policy) and by applying strategic decision 
making concepts and tools. 
 This paper does not dwell on a lengthy definitional debate or an extensive literature 
review.  Rather, the paper adopts the stance that Europeanization is ‘non-
controversial’ (Borzel and Risse, 2000, 4) (i.e. that the EU has had an effect on 
national political systems) and selectively focuses on some of the most useful points 
to emerge from some of the Europeanization literature.  The paper proceeds from the 
basis of the definition offered by one of the earliest discussions on the subject, which 
defined Europeanization as 
 
“…an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.” (Ladrech 1994: 
69 emphasis added) 
 
Usefully, Ladrech treats ‘organizational logic’ as a term broad enough to encompass 
governmental and non-governmental actors (ibid. 71) and, in common with the 
approach adopted in this paper, contends that political actors such as pressure groups 
respond to changes in their environment.  Crucially, and specifically, Ladrech argues 
that Europeanization (and the attendant altered domestic organizational logic) 
supplies the conditions for  
 
“new or developing behaviours and practices that at inspired by new rules and 
procedures emanating from the EC” (ibid. 72)  
 
and that this creates  
 
“expanded opportunities for national and subnational actors to exploit EU 
resources” (ibid. 72). 
 
The significance of opportunities and resources had been highlighted by some earlier 
work on social protest movements (Kitschelt 1986).  Kitschelt suggests that political 
opportunity structures (POS’s) comprise 
 
“…specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in 
others…[Crucially]…political opportunity structures can influence the choice 
of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their 
environments.” (Kitschelt 1986:58 emphasis added) 
 
Following the lead of Ladrech and Kitschelt, this paper argues that the process of 
Europeanization has fashioned an altered set of circumstances, namely political 
opportunity structures, intertwining the national and the EU.  Further, the paper 
contends that firms and environmental groups in the UK have adapted their behaviour 
in order to benefit from the ‘newly’ created opportunities. 
 
Management Science: Strategic Decision-Making 
Management science (Luffman et al. 1996: 6) normally focuses on the strategic 
(commercial) management
i of business organizations (although see Fairbrass 2002 for 
the application of management science ideas and tools to interest representation). 
Strategic management typically calls on a number of decision-making tools.  For the 
purposes of this paper, only a few particularly pertinent ones are selected and 
highlighted.  The basic model of the strategic management process generally 
comprises three main phases: strategic analysis; strategic choice; and strategy 
implementation (Johnson and Scholes 1993: 14-23). These in turn can be further 
broken down into their constituent parts. See Figure 1.  
 
------------------------------insert figure 1 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
The strategic analysis phase is typically carried out by combining two tools: a SWOT 
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) and PEST (Political, Economic, 
Social and Technological) analysis. The SWOT analysis guides an organization's 
decision makers through a monitoring process of the opportunities and threats present 
in an organization’s internal and external environment (Luffman et al., 1996, 62-76) 
with a view to assessing internal strengths and weaknesses.  Organizational strengths 
and weaknesses are generally categorized in terms of organizational structures, 
staffing (quantity and quality), marketing, production, and finances. The PEST 
analysis is used to review systematically the political, economic, social and technological factors present in the external environment.  For the purposes of this 
paper, external political factors provide the focal point of the analysis. 
 
Following the completion of the strategic analysis phase, organizations make strategic 
choices.  This amounts to the selection of a ‘deliberate strategy’ (i.e. planned) that is 
designed to achieve the organizations’s selected objectives.  However, depending on 
the nature of the external environment (i.e. the degree of stability and complexity) and 
the organization’s ability to effectively manage its internal resources, actual behaviour 
(i.e. its revealed strategy) may deviate from what was planned.  During 
implementation the organization’s revealed strategy (i.e. observable behaviour) may 
take the form of one of three alternatives: an emergent strategy (i.e. resembles but 
deviates to some degree from the original plan); an opportunistic strategy (i.e. 
behaviour which occurs on an ad hoc way in response to unexpected circumstances) 
or an unrealised strategy (i.e. the organization fails to achieve its planned outcomes).  
See figure 2.   
 
---------------------------------insert figure 2------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In the case of an interest group that chooses to lobby a particular set of policy-makers 
(be they local, national or supranational) the revealed behaviour, ideally, should lead 
to securing the desired rewards (e.g. political influence).  Actual outcomes may 
include an altered external environment (e.g. new favourable legislation) and/or 
revised organizational objectives, and/or a modified resource base (e.g. additional or 
improved knowledge).  At this point the decision-making cycle begins again as the 
organization takes stock of its new environment, objectives and/or resources.  
 
APPLYING STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING TOOLS AND CONCEPTS: 
CAUSES OF EUROPEANIZATION  
This paper contends that the extent to which any firm's or environmental group's 
revealed interest representation behaviour is Europeanized (i.e. altered to benefit from 
political opportunities created by the EU) is likely to be the product of three factors 
highlighted by the SWOT analysis: the organization's internal resources, their 
objectives, and the external political environment.  These aspects are examined below. 
 Internal Resources 
In comparing the internal resources commanded by a sample of UK utilities firms and 
environmental groups, it is clear from the data that the business interests tend to be 
better resourced than the environmental groups, although within each sector there is 
some diversity.  For example among the environmental groups that focus on 
biodiversity issues in the UK, only a handful can command substantial resources such 
as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF). 
 
------------------------------------insert tables 1 & 2--------------------------------------------- 
 
One study of interest groups presents aggregate data that suggests business and public 
interests (i.e. environmental, consumer and social/civil groups) are both capable of 
achieving comparable income and staffing levels (Greenwood 1997; see tables 1 and 
2).  When reviewing environmental group separately from other public interests it is 
evident that they had experienced a considerable increase in their resources during the 
1980s (Rawcliffe 1992: 3), accomplishing increases in their membership base 
(ranging from 35%-3900%), staffing (of between 25%-900%), and income (of 
between 127-2470%), albeit from relatively low bases (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 33-
56).  Comparative data gathered by this author suggest that there are substantial 
disparities between the largest UK utilities firms and environmental groups (see table 
3).   
 
-----------------------------------------insert table 3---------------------------------------------- 
 
As the largest UK telecommunications firm, BT, is substantially bigger than one of 
the major UK based environmental groups, the RSPB, when measured in terms of 
staff numbers and income.  In 2001, BT employed over 130,000 people compared to 
the RSPB’s 1,300 paid employees and nearly 9,000 volunteers (RSPB 2002).  BT’s 
annual turnover was over £20 billion compared to the RSPB’s £47.8 million income.  
The better-resourced private interests can more easily afford to establish a Brussels 
government relations office.  BT, for example, set up a Brussels office in 1989.  The 
RSPB does not operate its own Brussels office, but works with or through other 
groups such as Birdlife International and the WWF, which do have a Brussels office.  (See tables 4, 5 and 6 for data about those collective groupings that operate a Brussels 
office and when they were established).  Typically, the business sector established a 
Brussels presence earlier than the environmental sector: a finding that is not surprising 
in the light of the historical development of the EU. 
 
--------------------------------------insert tables 4, 5,and 6-------------------------------------- 
 
The significance of the resources available to the various telecommunications and 
energy firms and the environmental groups, and their ability to take advantage of the 
POS’s (especially at the EU level) is underlined by the following interview material.  
One of the senior members of the BT staff, based in the Brussels government relations 
office commented that: 
“[The] new entrants are small and do not have an office [in Brussels].  They 
rely on the trade association to speak [on their behalf].” (BT, 1997) 
 
This view was confirmed by the employee of a small and medium sized enterprise 
(SME) in the telecommunications sector who said that: 
 
“I do most of my EU-related work from London. […] The firm does belong to 
a telecommunications trade association [which] has an office in Brussels and 
represents the interests of the [industry].” (Satellite Information Services, 
1996) 
 
The impact of organizational resources (i.e. size) was also apparent to UK 
government officials.  One official made a link between size and another resource: 
knowledge.  He observed that, “[t]he larger companies understand how the game 
works” (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), European Community Research & 
Technological Development Unit (EC R&TDU), 1997) 
 
Similar variations emerged among the UK environmental groups.  One campaigner 
employed jointly by the RSPB and WWF to campaign for EU biodiversity legislation 
in the 1980s and 1990s, when talking about the overall approach to lobbying the EU, 
highlighted the significance of resources.  He commented that:  
“…you could take the policy battleground and probably set out a number of 
battle strategies that every campaign ought to follow […] There are a number 
of broad targets and issues.  These are the buttons you have got to hit.  You 
decide quite how important they are and prioritise them according to the 
weight that they can bring to what you are trying to achieve.  Your time and 
resources will determine which battles you get involved with…" (RSPB/WWF 
Joint campaigner 2000) 
 
The RSPB considered itself (RSPB 2000) to be both “small enough to be well co-
ordinated” but also “large enough to be an effective organisation at the national and/or 
European level”.  In contrast, an even smaller environmental group such as the 
Marine Conservation Society (MCS), which in the 1980s employed about three or 
four members of staff, regarded itself as being “too small to lobby Brussels directly”. 
The MSC respondent commented that: 
 
“…at that time [i.e. the 1980s], as a pretty small organisation, we certainly 
weren’t going off to the European Commission and doing things at that 
level…didn’t have the capacity to do that, so we were typical of an NGO that 
finds a piece of legislation coming out of Europe and then thinking what do 
we think of this. […]We had no part in saying there should be a habitats 
directive in the European Union…” (Marine Conservation Society 2000). 
 
Objectives 
An organization’s commercial (and other) objectives can play a major role in strategy 
selection.  In the case of the utilities firms and the environmental groups, their chosen 
objectives had an impact on their interest representation behaviour in a number of 
ways, not least in determining their allies.  For example, the UK government, 
telecommunications and energy sectors were in favour of market liberalisation and as 
a result the firms and the UK's DTI could work together.  This is reflected in the 
comment below about government-industry partnerships. 
  “The UK government is pro-liberalisation and the telecoms industry is pro-
liberalisation.  [We] are in agreement.” (DTI, EC R &TDU, 1997) 
 
Equally, political targets could be selected on the basis of commercial objectives.   
One senior member of staff in Directorate General (DG) XIII had observed that the 
telecoms firms that were prepared to establish direct contact with EU officials were 
"especially those companies who wanted to be ‘pan-European’ players.” (DG XIII, 
1997) 
 
Similarly, the importance of objectives for environmental groups is highlighted in the 
comments below.  An RSPB officer stated that the organization “had a really strong 
stake” in the EU’s biodiversity policy and legislation, and wanted the “modernisation” 
of the overall nature conservation regime (RSPB 2000).  As a result, during the 1970s, 
the EU’s 1979 Birds Directive was seen as “the RSPB’s top policy priority” and 
“substantial resources were thrown at the issue” (RSPB 2000).  However, in contrast 
to commonality of interest shared by the UK firms and the government, the 
environment groups could not count on the UK government as an ally.  One WWF-
UK campaigner noted that the UK government 
 
  “were dragged kicking and screaming into that policy [i.e. the Habitats 
Directive]. [The government] did everything they could to water it down and 
block it.  They had it foisted upon them and decided to implement it in the most 
minimalistic way it could.” (WWF-UK 2000) 
 
Ultimately, the lack of sympathy between the UK government and environment 
groups provided the latter with a strong incentive to seek allies elsewhere: namely in 
the shape of the European Parliament and Commission. 
 
External Political Environment 
For the utilities firms and the environmental groups there were both political 
opportunities and threats in their national and EU environments.  (See tables 7 and 8 
for a summary).   
 
-------------------------------insert tables 7 & 8--------------------------------------------------  
On balance there were probably more opportunities available to the firms than to the 
environmental groups.  For the firms there were substantial political opportunities at 
both the national and the EU political levels, although it was most likely that in the 
EU arena that the UK utilities firms would face their strongest threats (in the form of 
opposition to market liberalization among some influential EU member states).  These 
circumstances are evidenced by the comment below.  One DGXII official said that the 
large telecommunications operators had sought to exploit EU opportunities by 
 
“…coming to the EU centre - wanting harmonisation - wanting detailed 
regulations and a regulator at the European level” (DG XIII, 1997) 
 
One of the regulated firms confirmed this perception: that the EU and its regulatory 
function presented significant opportunities to the UK firms. 
 
“The decision to open the Brussels office was taken at corporate (i.e. most senior 
management level) level.  [It was due to] the increasing influence of the European 
Commission - especially in telecoms.” (BT, 1997) 
 
Clearly the UK firms were aware of the threats present at the EU level and responded 
accordingly.  The senior government relations officer in BT’s Brussels office 
commented that  
 
“[BT] put a lot of effort into ETNO [the Euro-group for telecoms] because of 
its influence with the Commission - for ‘damage limitation’ [purposes] - as 
other members of ETNO [were] hostile to [market] liberalisation.” (BT, 1997) 
 
One UK government official described the opposition to market liberalization in the 
electricity sector as follows: 
 
“The negotiations [with regard to the electricity liberalisation directive] were 
very difficult.  For two years the directive languished (1990-1992) with the 
European Parliament.  It was far too radical for the EU.  The Parliament 
produced over 300 amendments – the firms and the trade associations had much interaction with the EP.  Then the Commission revised the proposal – it 
was much watered down.  The French were the most strongly opposed – 
formidable opponents.  The negotiations really began in 1993 – they produced 
even more watered down proposals.” (DTI, Electricity/Nuclear Energy 
Division, 1997) 
 
Another UK government official summarized opposition in the gas sector in the 
following way: 
 
“[With regard to the gas liberalisation directive] the dominant lobbyists were 
the energy companies.  They lobbied for an ‘open market’.  There was a 
difficulty for state owned gas companies.  The Germans opened competition 
by access to pipelines.  The Dutch were quite close.  The French were more 
cautious.  [The French] wanted some competition to benefit large industrial 
users.  The French and the Belgians were a major stumbling block [to gas 
liberalisation].  The Austrians and Italians were negative.  The Spanish wanted 
liberalisation.  For the French the main concern was over security of supply 
and their public service commitment.  The French and Belgians wanted to 
frustrate competition.” (DTI, Oil and Gas Division, 1997) 
 
Significantly for the utilities firms they could count on some support from consumers 
as indicated in the comments below: 
 
“Progressively during the late 1980s/early 1990s, the objective was to achieve 
consensus among governments and operators, equipment manufacturers, and 
users.  [They were] all agreed that action was needed.  Liberalisation was 
favoured by all of the interested parties.  The operators wanted space to 
operate commercially.  The users wanted better, cheaper services. So did the 
consumers.” (DG XIII 1997)  
 
In contrast to the range of opportunities available to the firms at both the national and 
EU levels, the environmental groups found that the national political arena offered a 
lack of opportunity (and some distinct threats).  As a consequence the environmental 
groups were highly motivated to seek out the EU level opportunities that existed.  One campaigner commented that the WWF-UK had thought that the proposed Habitats 
Directive was  
 
“very important [and saw it as] a good opportunity to get new primary legislation 
[in the UK]”.  (WWF-UK 2000) 
 
Brussels-based environment groups, speaking on behalf of the UK based groups, were 
also aware of the opportunities and threats present.  One campaigner said: 
 
“[We are] up against huge lobby groups - not just the hunters, in the case of the 
Birds Directive.  We have to think of others like farmers.  We have to think of 
landowners in general [and] industries.  All [of] these huge interest groups [would] 
face problems by the implementation of the directives”. (Birdlife International 
2000). 
 
In summary, for both the UK registered utilities firms and the UK based 
environmental groups, their internal resources, objectives and external political 
environments helped to shape their selected interest representation strategies and 
actions.  The UK firms could command greater resources than the environmental 
groups and were better placed to exploit EU POS’s.  Despite their more restricted 
resources, there is evidence that the UK based environmental groups did seek out EU 
opportunities because they had a greater incentive to do so.  In the section that follows 
data are presented and analysed about the actual interest representation behaviour of 
the two sets of interests. 
 
EFFECTS: EUROPEANIZED INTEREST REPRESENTATION 
This section compares empirical data for the interest representation behaviour of UK 
firms and environmental groups.  Indicators such as the selected targets, routes and 
allies, and the nature of their contact with targets and intermediaries for the two sets 
of interests are contrasted in order to establish in what ways and to what extent their 
interest representation has been Europeanized.  See Figures 3 and 4 for a summary of 
the targets, routes, and allies employed by the two groups of interests.  Where the firms and environmental groups demonstrated a preference for exploiting EU political 
opportunity structures (e.g. targeting EU policy makers, making contact via European 
wide groupings or allying themselves with EU policy makers) this is treated as 
evidence of Europeanization  
 
--------------------------------------insert figures 3 & 4------------------------------------------ 
 
Targets 
Survey and interview data suggest that the UK utilities firms and environmental 
groups target both national and EU policy makers.  On occasions contact with EU 
policy makers was supplementary to interaction with national government officials.  
On other occasions it was preferred to contact with national officials.  One DTI 
official had observed that  
 
“[The] UK nuclear industry['s] contact with Brussels has not displaced 
Whitehall.  Direct contact with Brussels is in addition to [UK] government.” 
(DTI, Atomic Energy Unit, 1997) 
 
A second DTI respondent commented on the telecoms sector saying that, 
 
“There had been no change in the type of contact received from firms - no 
reduction in the amount of contact from individual firm - some increase.   
Firms may go to Brussels but it is in addition to contacting the DTI.” (DTI, EC 
R & TDU, 1997) 
 
By contrast a European Commission official had noted that 
 
“The telecoms sector [was] nationally based [but] since 1997 the ‘big 
operators’ [have started] stepping over the national regulators [and are coming 
direct to the Commission]." (DGXIII 1997) 
 
One environmental campaigner reported that there tended to be an  
 "ebb and flow [of interaction, with the] national government and the 
Commission [largely determined by the policy cycle]". (MCS 2000)   
 
One of the campaigners for the RSPB and WWF confirmed that contact with national 
officials was extremely important, as were their relationships with EU institutions. 
See Figure 4.   
 
“My intention was to ensure that I did not neglect any of the targets or routes 
[neither national nor EU].  To do so might incur the risk of defeat or 
opposition” (RSPB/WWF Joint Campaigner 2000). 
 
Clearly, in choosing targets the UK utilities firms were selective and purposeful.   
Within the UK government contact was successfully sought primarily with the DTI, 
owing to its role as one of the key negotiating departments for the 1992/Single Market 
Programme and the attendant market liberalization measures.  Other secondary targets 
included,  inter alia, the Cabinet Office and the DoE.  The former was important 
because of its responsibility for Competitiveness Policy and the latter was especially 
important for the energy sector firms.  In addition, for the telecommunications, gas 
and electricity firms, contact with the UK regulatory bodies (e.g. Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL), the Office of Gas Supply and the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (OFFER)) was also vital.   
 
A similarly selective process was in operation among the firms in relation to EU level 
targets.  A government relations officer for BT commented that “[BT's] focus is on 
DG XIII and IV.” (BT, 1997).  An energy sector respondent similarly remarked that 
contact is focused on particular DGs.  The interviewee stated that: 
 
“With regard to the Commission, we target DGVXII and IV.  DGXI is less 
important and, so too, DGXII” (Centrica, 1997)    
 
UK firms tended to place more emphasis on contact with the Commission than the 
European Parliament (EP).  One respondent admitted that: 
 “[BT] has less frequent contact with Members of the EP (MEPs) than the 
European Commission - maybe monthly." (BT, 1997)  
 
One MEP, who was first elected in 1979 to the European Parliament, had noted that: 
 
 
“In the beginning individual firms and trade associations didn’t take much 
notice of the EP – [this] cost them as a platform form propaganda – the Greens 
are very good at propaganda. The traditional attitude is to talk to the 
Commission and the Council – to ignore the EP.” (MEP R &TD /Energy  
Committees 1997) 
 
The UK firms were as selective in their targeting within the European Parliament as in 
their targeting of other bodies.  For example, individual MEPs were picked out for 
their personal interests and their membership of particular Committees. 
 
"Selected individuals are contacted informally, especially British MEPs.  BT 
is focused on a core of 12 to 15 MEPs.  They have been selected for their 
interests and committee membership.” (BT, 1997) 
 
The MEPs themselves were aware of the process in operation.  One MEP observed 
that: 
 “Individual companies and trade associations will have very specific requests.  
[They] will find out about the voting patterns of an MEP and have a hit list. 
[The firms] try to get contact with rapporteur.  This is a highly influential 
route.  Giving briefing papers to MEPs in the Strasbourg sessions is too late, 
but is a ‘topping off’ process, having already established a solid relationship 
with MEPs.” (MEP Research & Technological Development (R & TD) and 
Energy Committees, 1997) 
 
Another respondent commented that: 
 
“The companies had feelers out everywhere – they were very politically tuned 
in.  The companies had learnt very quickly about the political machinery - they 
had good contacts with the European Parliament – mostly British MEPs on relevant committees.  They cultivated contacts – because of the co-decision 
procedure.  Both the firms and the trade associations worked on the MEPs.  
The Commission has lost some power and companies recognise the power of 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.  The electricity 
directive came under co-decision – hence the emphasis on the European 
Parliament.” (DTI, Electricity/Nuclear Energy Division, 1997). 
 
In common with the UK utilities firms, the environmental groups also prioritised their 
targets. At the national level (within the UK Government), the DoE was seen as the 
most important target (WWF-UK 2000; MSC 2000; RSPB 2000), although access 
was also sought to (and not denied by) MAFF, the DTI, and the territorial offices 
within the UK, such as the Scottish Office. Environmental groups sought access to 
national officials because they recognised the value of the latter as important 
determinants of EU policy (particularly at the policy decision stage of the policy cycle 
in the Council of Ministers) (see Table 9). 
 
----------------------------------------insert table 9----------------------------------------------- 
 
In common with the UK firms, the environmental groups also prioritised their 
activities in relation to EU level institutions and tended to devote most effort to 
establishing and maintaining relations with the European Commission.  Within the 
Commission, DG XI was the most sought after target (RSPB 2000), although some 
resources were also expended in developing relations with the DGs responsible for 
agriculture, fisheries, transport, the EU budget and regional policy (Birdlife 
International 2000).  Amongst the other EU institutions, the groups selectively sought 
access to particular MEPs within the European Parliament.  The groups tended to 
focus on those MEPs who had shown a personal commitment to environmental issues 
or who played a significant role of the European Parliament’s Environment 
Committee (WWF-UK 2000; RSPB/WWF Joint Campaigner 2000; Birdlife 
International 2000). The environmental groups (RSPB/WWF Joint Campaigner 2000) 
placed less value on contact with the Economic and Social Committee (EcoSoc).  
 
For several of the environmental groups, access (albeit indirect access) to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played an extremely important role in shaping EU biodiversity policy.  A range of groups supported the Commission or UK courts in 
legal action against member states (the UK included) that had failed to comply with 
the Birds and Habitats Directives.  For the RSPB for example, the decision to pursue 
legal action against the UK and other EU member state governments, via the ECJ, 
was a “strategic decision” (RSPB 2000), taken at the Board level, because of the 
degree of commitment of resources required by such an action.  This approach was 
seen by the respondent as part of a long term strategy in which,  
 
“as the directives mature then the main centre will be focused on the law and the 
courts… [in order] to create new bridgeheads” (RSPB 2000). 
 
In effect, a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ was conducted before the RSPB had recourse to the 
ECJ.  This was partly because the group anticipated an adverse reaction from member 
state governments.  In the event there was a backlash (i.e. the UK Government’s 
vigorous campaign to dilute the 1992 Habitats Directive) after the Leybucht Dykes
ii 
ruling (RSPB 2000).  Similarly, the WWF also made a calculated decision to exploit 
legal channels, via EU institutions, against the UK Government.  This action was 
described in the following terms,  
 
“We do, very often, consciously think about what we do […] every time we 
[make] a complaint […] about a particular site or about transposition.  We know 
that we want the Commission to put pressure on the UK government [because] 
they [the Commission] weren’t in a position, without the information, to do 
anything about it” (WWF-UK 2000). 
 
Timing and quality of Contact  
Survey data (see Tables 10 and 11) indicate that the UK utilities firms tend to have 
more frequent contact with national officials than with EU level policy makers but 
interview evidence suggests that contact with both sets of policy makers is shaped by 
the policy cycle.   
 
---------------------------------insert tables 10 and 11------------------------------------------  
For well-resourced UK firms in the telecommunications and energy sectors, contact 
with the Commission can be as frequent as with national officials.  For example, the 
BT office in Brussels described its contact with the European Commission as 
 
  “…daily, [ranging] from formal written papers to informal ‘chats’, at all 
levels from Commissioner down to lower DG staff.  [They tend] to match the 
level (i.e. Chief Executive Officer meets Commissioner).  (BT, 1997) 
 
Similarly, staff in Centrica's Brussels office commented that their contact with the 
Commission tended   
 
“…to match staff [i.e. same level of seniority]. There is contact with the 
Commissioner, the Director General, and the Head of Section or Division.  [It] can 
be weekly.  [It] can be two-way.  There is a range of activities – including letters, 
papers, lunch and telephone calls.  Both initiate. (Centrica, 1997) 
 
Contact between the utilities firms and EU policy makers tended to intensify during 
periods when market liberalisation directives were being negotiated. One of the 
government relations managers of Centrica commented that contact became  
 
“more intensive [with the Commission] because of liberalisation 
negotiations.” (Centrica, 1997)  
BT government relations staff made similar comments: 
 
“There has been a development in the level of [our] contact with the 
Commission.  Before the 1987 Green Paper [concerning the liberalization of 
the telecommunications market] there was little exchange - since then a major 
change - increased frequency.” (BT, 1997) 
 
This pattern of contact was confirmed by a Commission staff member who observed 
that: “The density of contact from firms depends on the actions in DGXIII – when a 
directive or a proposal is on the table, then there is greater lobbying activity.” 
(DGXIII, 1997) 
 
Within the national arena, contact with state bodies also tended to be determined by 
the policy cycle.  For example, one DTI official commented that  
 
“The DTI is more likely to be heavily involved and a target for pressure 
groups [at an early stage of the policy process].  OFTEL [the 
telecommunications regulatory body in the UK] is more heavily involved 
during implementation.” (DTI Domestic Policy-Telecommunications 1997).  
 
It is also evident from the interviews conducted with the environmental groups and 
the policy-makers that the policy making cycle's peaks and troughs had an impact on 
the groups’ interest representation activities. The actual pattern of activities tended to 
reflect the importance of the policy phases (i.e. policy stage would determine access 
target and the need for contact).  
 
“[It was] very important to try to get in on the process at the very beginning – 
if you can find out that it is going on – since directives are very difficult to 
undo.  DGXI was the main target.  Once [the Habitats Directive] had been 
agreed, then the main focus of activity returned to the national level because of 
transposition [and] implementation. The Commission is currently being 
targeted because of [its] key role in the Natura 2000 sites moderation process.  
It is likely that focus will shift back again once the member states have to 
undertake the reporting part of the process”. (MSC 2000). 
 
Routes  
Earlier academic research suggests that interests groups and individual firms will 
choose to use one or more of three potential routes to gain access to EU level policy-
makers: the ‘direct’ route; the ‘national’ route; and the ‘European’ route (see Grant 
1989; Bennett 1997 and 1999; Fairbrass 2002).  The UK utilities firms exploited a 
number of conduits to make contact with EU policy makers.  The survey data suggest 
that the larger firms such as the major telecoms operators and gas producers preferred to make direct contact (i.e. choosing not to make representations via an intermediary) 
but almost equally important was the use of trade associations at the national and EU 
level and the national government officials.  See table 12 and the observations below.   
 
-------------------------------------Insert table 12------------------------------------------------ 
 
The use of the Brussels office to lever the national government reflects the 
significance of regulation arising at the supranational level.  One interviewee stated 
that 
 
“The Brussels office was established in 1992…It handled a number of issues – 
for example, liberalisation, VAT on fuel, tax on energy, waste, and appliance 
regulation.  Some issues are long term and need alliances with trade 
associations and other firms.  There is always the danger of missing issues – 
you find out too late.  There is so much law.  You need to watch out.   
Sometimes [she] would even lever the UK from Brussels – particularly as the 
EU was delaying competition and the UK wanted to accelerate it.” (Centrica, 
1997) 
 
One MEP noted that: 
 
“Big players do it [lobbying] both ways – via direct contact and via trade 
associations.” (MEP Energy Committee 1997) 
 
and a Commission official recognized that:  
 
“BT comes direct to the Commission.  BT uses the DTI when it suits them.” 
(DGXIII, 1997) 
 
The empirical evidence shows that the UK based environmental groups also sought 
and gained access to EU level policy-makers via one or more of three potential 
conduits.  They had established direct contact with EU officials, placed some reliance 
on lobbying via the national executive, and operated via European groupings.  There 
is evidence that smaller UK based groups, which are relatively poorly resourced, such as the MSC have worked to influence biodiversity policy via a wider UK grouping, 
namely Wildlife and Countryside Link (MSC 2000).  At the national-EU level 
interface, there were ample examples of national groups co-operating to access EU 
policy-makers, to shape EU policy.  The RSPB worked with and through the 
Brussels-based Birdlife International.  The RSPB was also part of a more 
heterogeneous grouping lobbying for biodiversity protection that included the Council 
for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), WWF, and Wildlife Trust (RSPB/WWF 
Joint Campaigner 2000). WWF’s Brussels offices host the European Habitats Forum, 
which is another example of a wider grouping.  It is clear that environmental groups 
have been able to work collectively despite having a variety of aims and approaches 
(RSPB/WWF Joint Campaigner 2000).  The groups are careful not to undermine each 
other and will actively support one another where they are able to do so.  For 




One feature that distinguishes the firms from the environmental groups was their 
contrasting use of alliances.  Since the firms and the UK government had shared 
objectives with respect to market liberalization they were able to ally themselves.  By 
contrast, the UK based environmental groups and the UK government held different 
policy positions and the environmental groups therefore tended to seek out other 
partners, such the European Commission or other environmental groups (especially 
those with a Brussels base).  This pattern is revealed in the data below. 
 
One of the largest UK based energy players described their relationship with the 
British government in the following terms: 
 
“Generally, there is frequent contact [with Her Majesty's Government 
(HMG)]. […]There is a close alignment between HMG and Centrica.” 
(Centrica, 1997) 
 
There is evidence that the environmental groups were also able to establish close 
relations with the Commission and the European Parliament, particularly at early 
stages of the policy cycle in relation to the 1979 Birds and the 1992 Habitats Directives.  Early contact was crucial to the policy development.  Alliances with 
individuals in both institutions were thought by the environmental groups to be highly 
influential in policy development as indicated below: 
 
“Without those two [i.e. a senior member of staff in DGXI and the 
Commissioner for DGXI] the [Habitats] Directive would not have got off the 
blocks.” (RSPB/WWF Joint Campaigner 2000).  
 
and 
“My suspicion is that the Commission probably wouldn’t have taken this [i.e. 
the Habitats Directive] forward – if it hadn’t been for pressure from the NGO 
movement outside plus a willing, dedicated, enthusiastic MEP.” (RSPB/WWF 
Joint Campaigner 2000). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Outwardly, at least, the evidence would seem to suggest a number of similarities 
between the UK registered firms and the UK based environmental groups.  The 
interest representation of both sets of actors has been Europeanized.  That is, relations 
between them and state actors in the national arena had been affected by extension of 
EU competence in their policy area (i.e. industrial/macro-economic management and 
environmental policy).  Similarly, the relations between the national actors and the 
EU actors had been affected.  However, some important differences emerge when the 
following questions are addressed.  How, to what extent and why has there been a 
Europeanization of interest representation behaviour among UK utilities firms and 
UK environmental groups? 
 
Both sets of interests have been Europeanized in as far they exploit ‘new’ or 
additional EU-level political opportunities.  The firms and the environmental groups 
both established direct relations with the European Commission and Parliament, 
although there is evidence that the firms were better placed to make direct contact 
with EU level policy makers than the nature conservation groups.  The firms and the 
environmental groups both worked with or through Brussels-based and/or European-
wide interest groupings to supplement and support their direct contact with EU level policy makers, although it was the environmental groups that placed greater emphasis 
on this routing than the firms.  In attempting to shape policy, the firms could rely on 
support from the UK government: the environmental groups were more likely to face 
opposition or hostility from the national government departments.  Therefore, in terms 
of ‘how’ and ‘to what extent’ the interest representation activities of the firms and the 
environmentalists had been Europeanized, the differences are quite subtle.  There are 
relatively small variations in the effects of Europeanization in this case study.  More 
striking contrasts are apparent when the causal mechanisms are examined. 
 
When examining ‘why’ the two sets of interests have been Europeanized that stronger 
differences can be discerned.  The UK registered firms and the environmental groups 
enjoy dissimilar levels of resources: the telecommunications, gas and electricity firms 
command greater staffing and funding than can the nature conservation groups.   
Connected to this, is the issue of objectives.  The UK firms and the UK government 
shared the objective of market liberalization, and the firms were able to call on 
national government departments as a source of political support.  Nature 
conservation groups and the UK government did not share as much common ground.  
The environmental groups were determined to strengthen EU biodiversity protection 
legislation.  By contrast, the UK government was hostile to some aspects of the EU’s 
draft biodiversity protection legislation which was perceived to an intrusion into 
national policy making, as indeed the 1992 Habitats Directive was considered to be by 
the UK government (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a and 2001b).  In that respect, the 
environmental groups could well have counted the UK government, even the DoE, as 
one of its opponents.   
 
This leads to the issue of the external political environment.  For the UK firms, both 
the national and the EU political environments offered substantial political 
opportunities, particularly with regard to securing market liberalization.  The DTI, 
UK, OFTEL, the European Commission, and consumers of telecommunications and 
energy services and products (some of whom were major firms in their own right) 
supported market liberalization.  Opposition to market liberalization had come from a 
number of EU member state governments (e.g. France).  However, during the 1980s 
and 1990s opposition waned.  By contrasts, for the UK nature conservationists, the 
UK political environment contained several significant threats (or at best a lack of opportunities) and the EU arena comprised a more favourable political environment.  
The European Commission and the EP supplied some influential allies for the 
environmental groups and opportunities to create powerful biodiversity protection 
legislation.  Such circumstances gave the less well resourced UK environmental 
groups compelling reasons to try to exploit the EU opportunities, often working with 
Brussels based groupings to try to achieve their objectives. 
 
In sum, the interest representation of the UK firms and environmental groups had both 
been Europeanized (i.e. their behaviour has been affected by the EU), although there 
are subtle but discernible distinctions between the behaviour of the two sets of 
interests.  Crucially, differences in the causal motors of Europeanization (i.e. 
dissimilar internal resources, external environments and objectives) led to variations 
in the effects of Europeanization (i.e. choice of lobbying targets, routes, partners and 
types of contact).  As a result of being able to command greater internal 
organizational resources and enjoy more favourable external environments at the 
national and EU levels, including shared objectives with a wider range of influential 
state and non-state actors, the UK firms operated as political actors at both the 
national and EU levels of governance.  Whilst their interest representation had clearly 
been Europeanized, in one sense they had less need for EU level political 
opportunities than the environmental groups.  By contrast, in so far as the UK based 
environmental groups possessed fewer internal resources and faced distinct threats at 
the national level, they were compelled to try to secure their objectives by allying 
themselves with EU level state and non-state actors. As a result they were more 
Europeanized: there were powerful incentives for them to be so.  In conclusion, by 
combining ideas and tools drawn from political science and management science it 
has been possible to evaluate and explain the process of Europeanization.  As ever, 
the challenge remains to establish whether the patterns of behaviour identified and 
analysed here are restricted to these two sectors or whether they are part of a broader 
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Employment levels among a sample of business and public-interest Euro-groups 




0 7  9 
1 or 1.5  9  6 
2 or 2.5  29  20 
3 or 3.5  12  8 
4 12  5 
5 4  7 
6 to 10  13  20 
11+ 13  26 
Total 100  100 
 
Source: Adapted from Greenwood 1997, pages 102 and 180 
 
 
Table 2  
Turnover of a sample of business and public-interest Euro-groups 




0 to 20,000  20  10 
20,001 to 50,000  14  14 
50,001 to 100,000  12  12 
Over 100,000  53  64 
Total 100  100 
Source: Adapted from Greenwood 1997, pages 103 and 180 
 Table 3 
Resources of business and environmental groups 












– year ending 
2001 (a) 
BT  133,400  120  Yes – with 8 





1,906 1    £232.2m 
BG Group  19,745  Centrica 





















Powergen 7,034 10  No  £4.9  bn 
Scottish Power  22,407  1.5    £6.3 bn 
RSPB 1,300  Data  not 
supplied by 
respondent 






CPRE 60  Data  not 
supplied by 
respondent 
No Data  not 
supplied by 
respondent 
FoE 130  Data  not 
supplied by 
respondent 
Yes Approx  £5m 












(a) Data for utilities firms extracted from Thompson Financial 2001 for year 
ended 2001.  Data for environmental groups gathered from their websites 
(2002) relates to year ended 2001. 
(b) Data gathered for utilities firms from postal survey and interviews conducted 
by the author over four year period from 1995-1999.  Data for environmental 
groups gathered from interviews conducted by the author during 2000. 
 Table 4 
Brussels offices of environmental groups (April 1996) 
Name of organisation  Year of establishment of 
Brussels Office 










Birdlife International  1993  2 
Greenpeace 1988  4 
Friends of the Earth  1989  8 
Climate Network Europe  1989  2 
Source: Extracted from Webster 1998 (pp 178-182) 
 
Table 5 
Brussels offices of umbrella business groups 
Name of organisation  Year of establishment of 
Brussels Office 
Number of Staff 
UNICE 1958  30  employees 
EUROCHAMBRES 1958  Not  available 
ERT 1983 Not  available 
AMCHAM 1948  17  employees 




Brussels offices of sectoral business groups (1995-1997) 
Name of organisation  Year of establishment of 
organization 
Total number of Staff 
ECTEL  1985 (Brussels office set in 
1986) 
2  
ETNO  1989 (Brussels office set 
up in 1991) 
7 
Eurogas 1990  5 
Eurelectic Not  available  5 
Source: Survey by author, 1995-1997 
 Table 7 
Environmental Groups: National and EU political opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities Threats 
Public Support for nature conservation 
legislation 
Counter groups e.g. farmers, forestry 
interests, and port authorities. 
European Commission’s and European 
Parliament’s demand for expertise and 
technical information on biodiversity 
UK government hostility to the draft 
Habitats Directive 
European Commission’s and European 
Parliament’s need for political support 
Lack of implementation at national level 
in the UK 
Europeanization of the DoE: 
strengthening of department in relation to 
hostile UK central government 
departments 
Opposition in other EU member states 
with strong pro-hunting lobbies e.g. 




Political National and EU opportunities and Threats for utilities 
Opportunities Threats 
UK government supportive of market 
liberalization in the utilities sector 
Some EU member states opposed to 
market liberalization e.g. France 
European Commission in favour of 
market liberalization in the utilities sector 
UK government hostile to idea of pan-EU 
regulator 
European Commission need for political 
support for market liberalization 
Countervailing interests e.g. trade unions 
opposed to market liberalisation 




Attitudinal response of groups to the importance of the EU 
Statement  Groups agreeing  Groups disagreeing  Not answered 
The EU is now 
more important 
then the UK 
government in the 
creation of EU 
policy 
60% (18)  20% (6)  20% (6) 
Source: Ward and Lowe 1998: p 158 
 Table 10 
Frequency of contact with UK government 
Frequency  % of firms 
surveyed 
Never 6 









Frequency of contact with EU officials 
Frequency  % of firms 
surveyed 
Never 11 









Routes used by firms to contact EU policy makers 
Function  % of firms 
surveyed 
Direct contact (no intermediary)  44 
Via UK trade association  28 
Via local chamber of commerce  3 
Via European grouping  22 
Via UK government officials  25 
PR firm  11 
Source: Survey by author, 1995-1997 
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Feedback and learning 
 
Source: Adapted from Johnson and Scholes, 1993: 23 
Strategic 
Analysis 

























resources Figure 2 
Internal Resources, objectives, and external environment 
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Figure 3 Targets, routes and allies: Business groups         






























e.g.  Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee 
 
Individual firms e.g. British 




of Trade and 
Industry  
DGs III (Industry), IV (Competition), XII (Research), 
XIII (Telecommunications), XV (Internal market), 
and XVII (Energy) 
European groupings based in 
Brussels e.g. Eurogas, ETNO, 
ECTEL and Eurelectric 
National Trade Associations 
European Court of 
Justice 
Key: 
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Figure 4 Targets, routes and allies: Environmental groups 





















































National nature conservation 
NGOs in other EU member 
states 
DG XI (Environment) 
Groupings with a Brussels 
Office/based in Brussels e.g. 
Birdlife International and WWF 
Other DGs e.g. 
DG VI 
(Agriculture) 
European Court of 
Justice 
Key: 
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i Strategic management can be defined as that set of decisions and actions that lead to 
the development of an effective strategy (or strategies) to help achieve (corporate) 
objectives. 
ii In the Leybucht case, the ECJ rejected the Commission’s argument that the 
protection of SPAs was an absolute duty other than when there were risks to human 
life.  But it also rejected the German government’s demand for a wide margin of 
discretion when identifying SPAs.  Many Member States were so alarmed by the ECJ 
ruling that they worked to secure amendments.  The Habitats Directive responds to 
these by permitting states to take social and economic factors into account when 
managing SPAs. 